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CORRESPONDENT BANKING AND INSIDER LOANS
AFTER THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
REGULATORY AND INTEREST RATE CONTROL ACT
OF 1978
A series of major bank failures from 1973 to 1976,1 caused primarily
by insider abuses,2 demonstrated the need for reform of the nation's
iinancial regulatory apparatus.3 The abuses generally involved banks'
I See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 9273, 9279 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1383 and hereinafter paginated
to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS]. The United States National Bank of San Diego failed in
1973 as a result of massive insider abuses. Id. at 9280. The bank's chief executive officer
drained over 400 million dollars of bank assets in the form of loans for use in his other
enterprises. Id. Federal officials, although aware of the abuses for eleven years prior to the
bank's failure, neglected to prevent the improvident loans. Id. at 9281. Subsequently, sev-
eral other major banks collapsed due to insider abuses: Id. See generally note 10 infra.
' The label of "insider" applies to persons exercising influence over bank policies re-
gardless of employment titles and compensation, or recorded ownership in bank stock. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b, 1972(2)(Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying note 9 infra.
3 Bank regulation is accomplished through three federal bank supervisory agencies: the
Comptroller of the Currency who is responsible for administration of national banks; the
Federal Reserve Board which formulates monetary policy and regulates all banks which are
member of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) which provides protection for depositors of both member banks of the Federal Re-
serve System and insured nonmember banks through insurance and supervisory functions.
See Note, The Federal Bank Commission Act: A Proposal to Consolidate The Federal
Banking Agencies, 25 CLv. ST. L. Rav. 475, 475 n.4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Proposal to
Consolidate]. The three administrative agencies evolved at different times in response to
various economic needs and have been criticized for lack of coordination and inability to
insure safe commercial banking. See id. at 477, 494.
Until 1863 all banks were state chartered with the exception of two short-lived national
banks in the early 19th century. Id. at 477. Congress established a national banking system
by passing the National Currency Act of 1863, which authorized chartering of national bank
associations and the corresponding issuance of national bank notes. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, 12
Stat. 665; see Proposal to Consolidate, supra, at 477. The Currency Act vested supervisory
powers over the banking association in the Currency Bureau of the Treasury Department,
headed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. In 1864, Congress superseded the Currency
Act with the National Bank Act, which established the modern framework for bank regula-
tion. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99; Proposal to Consolidate, supra at 477. In
1913, Congress enacted the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) in response to the financial panic of
1907. Id. The FRA coordinates individual banks and created Federal Reserve Banks to act
as depositaries and fiscal agents of the government. See Englehart, Bank Supervision in
Historical Perspective, 34 Bus. LAw. 1659, 1670-71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Supervi-
sion]. The FRA also defines the powers and duties of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and requires that the Board examine the financial condition of the system's
state-chartered member banks. See Buchalter and Allen, Bank Insider Abuses: When does
the Ax Fall?, 96 BANKING L.J. 804, 805 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Insider Abuses]. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, enacted in response to the stock market crash of
1929 and subsequent bank failures in the 1930's, created the FDIC to insure the deposits of
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dealings with large shareholders and the extension of preferential loans to
insiders of other banks which maintained correspondent accounts 4 with
national banks, members of the federal reserve system, and qualifying state banks. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1814 (1976); Proposal to Consolidate, supra at 477.
The banking system in the United States consists of four bank classes which determine
which agency or agencies may regulate a specific bank. Id. at 476. National banks, chartered
under federal law, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1976), are supervised primarily by the Comptroller of
the Currency. See 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1976); Proposal To Consolidate, supra at 476. Neverthe-
less, national banks are also subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board by reason of
mandatory membership in the Federal Reserve System, and to regulation by the FDIC. 12
U.S.C. §§ 222-23 (1976); Proposal To Consolidate, supra at 476. Additionally, all national
banks must be insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §§ 282, 501a (1976). The other three bank
classes consist of state-chartered banks, which are subject to regulation by the state banking
authority exercising jurisdiction over the bank charter. Proposal To Consolidate, supra at
476. Voluntary members of the Federal Reserve System comprise the first class of state-
chartered banks. These banks are subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board and
by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). The second class of state banks consists of those
insured by the FDIC, but which are not members of the Federal Reserve System. These
insured, nonmember banks, are subject to regulation by the FDIC. Id. § 1820(b) (1976). The
third group of state banks are those which are neither insured by the FDIC nor members of
the Federal Reserve System. Members of this third group are only subject to state regula-
tion. See Proposal To Consolidate, supra at 476-77. Although Congress considered propos-
als to create a combined federal banking agency exercising the consolidated regulatory
powers of the existing three regulatory agencies, no composite agency has yet been created.
See id. at 494.
" A correspondent account is a non-interest bearing demand deposit account main-
tained by Bank A with Bank B for the purpose of compensating Bank B for services ren-
dered to Bank A. 12 C.F.R. § 214.21(d) (1979). The necessity for the correspondent banking
system stems from the fact that approximately 9,000 banks in the United States are not
members of the Federal Reserve System and, therefore, do not have direct access to the
check clearing and payment mechanisms of that system. See The Safe Banking Act of 1977:
Hearing on H.R. 9086 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regula-
tions, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 943-44 (1978) (statement of Quinton Thompson, Regional Director, FDIC)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 9086]. Because most state laws require that certain
amounts of bank reserve be in cash or due from other banks, many nonmember banks keep
their reserves in the larger member banks in interest-free checking accounts. Id. at 944. In
exchange for these reserves, the larger bank provides services for the nonmember bank.
These services include check clearing, data processing, advice on loans and investments, and
purchase and sale of securities. Id. Since the federal reserve system does not perform all of
these services, member banks also use larger banks as correspondents and must keep excess
reserves to obtain the services. Id. Compensation of the bank providing the services (corre-
spondent bank) by the bank purchasing the services (respondent bank) is not on a strict fee
basis by which a charge for each particular service may be itemized. Id. at 944, 956. Critics
of the correspondent banking sytem in this country note that the compensating balances
which act as payment for the services provided are divorced from the actual services, and
therefore make a determination of the cost of each service provided impossible. Id. at 956
(statement of Martin Myers). Until stockholders know how much of a correspondent ac-
count is necessary for the services provided by correspondent banks and the expenses are
itemized, correspondent accounts will remain subject to abuse. Id. at 947 (statement of Mr.
Pickett). The potential financial damage due to abuse of correspondent accounts is great
because of the large deposits in the accounts. A respondent bank typically maintains with a
major correspondent bank an account which fluctuates from $800,000 to $1,800,000, and
which rarely falls below $700,000. Id. at 377 (statement of Mr. Cleveland).
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the lending institution.5 In 1977, the "Bert Lance affair"6 again focused
public attention on insider banking transactions and added significant
impetus to the banking reform movement.7 Congress responded to the
problem of insider abuses by passing the Financial Institutions Regula-
tory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (the Act or FIRICA),8 which
B See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 1, at 9282, 9285.
6 In 1974, T. Bertram Lance staged an unsuccessful primary campaign for the Georgia
Democratic gubernatorial position. During the campaign Lance served first as president,
and later as chairman of the Calhoun First National Bank [Calhoun]. See Hearings on H.R.
9086, supra note 4, at 30. In 1975 Lance and several associates acquired controlling interest
in the National Bank of Georgia [NBG], of which Lance subsequently became President.
See id. at 30 [letter from Robert Bloom, acting Comptroller of the Currency].
During a regularly scheduled examination of the Calhoun Bank in 1975, examiners dis-
covered that the bank permitted the "Lance for Governor Campaign" to overdraw its ac-
count in 1974. See id. at 10. An investigation by the Comptroller of the Currency, however,
established that no violation of banking law occurred. See id. Nevertheless, in 1975, the
Securities Exchange Commission filed a complaint alleging that NGB, Calhoun, and Lance
engaged in a course of business which included financial irregularities and unsafe banking
practices. See SEC v. The National Bank of Georgia, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 196,402 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The complaint maintained that loans from Calhoun to
Lance and certain of his relatives, friends and associates were made on preferential terms
without adequate consideration of the burrowers' credit worthiness. Id.
With respect to loans by Calhoun to several of his relatives, the SEC alleged that Lance
prepared and signed the names of certain relatives to financial statements which overstated
the relatives' net worth. Id. An investigation by the Comptroller revealed that the checking
accounts of 9 relatives showed overdrafts from 1972 to 1975. See Hearings on H.R. 9086,
supra note 4, at 12 [remarks of Donald Tarleton, Regional Administrator Office of Comp-
troller of Currency]. The total amount of the overdrafts once reached $450,000. Id. The
Comptroller's report also noted that the Calhoun Bank permitted officers, directors, some
employees, and their families to overdraw their accounts and did not charge interest for
periods during which the accounts were overdrawn. Id. Other evidence indicated that Lance,
as president of NGB, used correspondent bank relationships to secure personal loans for
himself. In the same month that Citizens and Southern Bank increased loans from $335,000
to $935,000 to Lance, his campaign committee, and companies in which he was a principal,
NGB added over $1,700,000 to their account with Citizens and Southern. See id. at 247.
Thereafter the loan to Lance and his associates interests climbed to over $1 million and the
average deposite NBG kept with Citizens and Southern increased to amounts ranging from
$2 million to $4 million.
Lance did not contest the SEC complaint, instead signing a consent agreement promis-
ing to perform or refrain from certain activities. Among other provisions of the consent
agreement, Lance agreed not to overdraft any checking account except to the extent availa-
ble to offer bank customers and not to obtain a loan from any bank in connection with any
campaign by him for political office. See SEC v. The National Bank of Georgia, 1 96,402.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 1, at 9283-84. Although the Lance affair received
much media coverage, the effect of the affair should not be overemphasized. Changes in
bank insider regulations are attributable primarily to investigations regarding major bank
failures in the 1970's. Id at 9279-81; see note 1 supra.
; Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-639, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1978)). In 1977,
the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
held extensive hearings on the proposed Safe Banking Act of 1977. See Hearings on H.R.
9086, supra note 4. As a result of these hearings and a committee markup, the House Com-
mittee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs introduced the Financial Institutions Regu-
1980] 1329
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became effective on March 11, 1979.
The Act curbs insider abuses by expansively defining "insiders" to
include individuals exercising actual influence over bank policies9 and by
creating stricter enforcement powers for the federal regulatory agencies.' °
The insider prohibitions of FIRICA restrict loans from banks to insiders
of the lending bank,1 and regulate loans from banks to insiders of corre-
spondent institutions. 2 Title I of the Act,13 codified in part at sections
latory Act of 1978 to the House of Representatives. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 1, at
9275. The House joined the bill with the Interest Rate Control Act under consideration in
the Senate, approved the combined legislation on October 11, 1978, and concurred in the
Senate amendments on October 15, 1978. See id.
9 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b, 1972(2) (Supp. II 1978); note 2 supra. Depending on the
specific prohibition, directors, executive officers, principal shareholders, affiliates, and cer-
tain members of political or campaign committees are considered insiders. Directors include
paid and unpaid directors of banks, directors of bank holding companies, and directors of
any subsidiary of a bank.holding company. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(c) (1979). Executive officers
are non-directors who have authority to participate in major policy-making functions of a
bank or company without regard to such officer's title or salary. Id. § 215.2(d) (1979). Exec-
utive officers of affiliate companies are also considered executive officers of the bank unless
the boards of both the affiliate and the bank resolve to exclude the affiliate's executive of-
ficer from participation in bank policy-making. Principal shareholders include persons or
companies which directly or indirectly own, control, or have the power to vote a certain
percentage of a bank's voting securities. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(j) (1979).
"0 FIRICA authorizes the three bankifig agencies, see note 3 supra, to impose daily civil
money penalties against institutions and insiders violating the Act, grants the agencies im-
proved cease and desist authority, and empowers the agencies with improved provisions for
removing and suspending insiders who violate the Act's prohibitions. See H.R. REP. No.
1383, supra note 1, at 9289. Civil fines, a new tool of the regulatory agencies, add needed
flexibility to the regulatory apparatus. Prior to the enactment of FIRICA, regulatory agen-
cies often either ignored violations or imposed cease and desist orders. See id. Cease and
desist orders, however, were often considered too severe for the criticized action, and legisla-
tors believed that the threat of daily civil money penalties would serve to deter violations of
the Act without involving undue harshness. Further, under prior law, the banking agencies
could issue cease and desist orders only against institutions. Orders directed at an entire
institution, however, can be inappropriate where a single insider engages in prohibited activ-
ities. See id. at 9290. In the event that the daily management of a bank is controlled by a
single stockholder or other insider, a cease and desist order against the bank itself may
unjustly discredit the institution's reputation if the condemned practices are the sole re-
sponsibility of the controlling insider. See id. Accordingly, FIRICA provides for issuance of
cease and desist orders against individual violators of the Act. Finally, the new statute
presents a less burdensome test for instituting removal or suspension proceedings against an
individual violating the Act. Before passage of FIRICA, an insider could be removed from
his bank-related position by the regulatory agencies only upon a showing that the insider
engaged in unsafe practices adversely affecting the institution and that the alleged unsafe
practices involved personal dishonesty. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra at 9290. The new
FIRICA provisions authorize removal when an insider demonstrates personal dishonesty or
evidences disregard for the soundness of the financial institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(2)
(Supp. II 1978). In addition to the sanctions of fines, removal, and cease and desist orders,
the enforcement provisions of the Act allow for a hearing and review of the enforcing
agency's actions. Id. § 1818(h)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
1 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
12 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. II 1978).
'3 See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L.
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375a and 375b of title 12 of the United States Code,14 regulates loans to
insiders of the lending institution. Section 375a prohibits member banks
of the Federal Reserve System15 (member banks) from extending credit'1
to their own executive officers17 unless expressly authorized by the stat-
ute.18 Section 375a also requires a prompt report to the bank's board of
directors of all loans made by the bank to its executive officers, and ex-
pressly forbids banks from extending preferential treatment 9 to their
own executive officers.
Regardless of the terms of the loan, section 375a authorizes only cer-
tain extensions of credit to executive officers. Authorization is extended
to personal home mortgages not exceeding $60,000 which are secured-by
first liens,20 loans to finance the education of officers' children in out-
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codifies in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1978)). Title I
of the Act, entitled Supervisory Authority Over Depository Institutions, generally sets out
prohibitions, penalties, and hearing and notice procedures for regulating various depository
institutions.
14 12 U.S.C §§ 375a & 375b (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
15 The term "member bank of the Federal Reserve System" refers to any banking insti-
tution which belongs to the Federal Reserve System, but does not include domestic
branches of foreign banks. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(g) (1979).
16 For the purposes of § 375a, an extention of credit is a loan or any other type of
credit. 12 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (1979). The term "extension of credit" does not, however, in-
clude such things as advances against accrued compensation or preauthorized loans of up to
$5,000 which also are available to general bank customers. Id. § 215.3(b)(1), (5) (1979).
17 See 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(d) (1979); note 9 supra. The term "executive officer" includes
the chairman of the board, the president, all vice-presidents, the cashier, the secretary, and
the treasurer of a bank unless the bank resolves to exclude such officer from non-directorial
policymaking and the officer actually abides by the resolution. See 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(d)
(1979).
.12 U.S.C. § 375a(1) (Supp. 1 1978); see text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
" 12 U.S.C. § 375a(1)(A), (B) (Supp. H 1978). An extension of credit is preferential if
the bank is unauthorized to make such a credit extension to borrowers other than bank
officers or if the terms of the loans are more favorable to the bank's officers than the terms
accorded other borrowers. Id.
20 Id. § 375a(2) (Supp. H 1978). A bank's board of directors specifically must approve
all home mortgage loans to the bank's executive officers before extending the loan. Id. As a
further condition on the loan, the mortgage must be secured for a "dwelling which is ex-
pected, after the making of the loan, to be owned by the officer and used by him as his
residence. . . "Id. § 375a(2)(A). The statutory language of § 375a does not, however, estab-
lish whether the expectation of the dwelling's use and ownership is to be held by the board
of directors authorizing the 1Man or by the borrowing officer. Also, the placement of the
phrase "after the making of the loan" implies that the expectation of the dwelling's use is to
continue after the loan is granted. Such construction would require an unreasonable and
continuing expectation of the officer's ownership and use of the dwelling. A construction
embodying the more probable intent of the draftsmen would read "the mortgage must be
secured for a dwelling which is expected to be owned by the officer and used by him as his
residence after the loan is granted." In addition, banks may not extend mortgage loans to an
executive officer when the bank has any other outstanding mortgage loans to the same of-
ficer. Id. § 375a(2)(B). This restriction on mortgage loans applies regardless of the respective
loan amounts. Thus, even though the permissible amount of a single mortgage loan is
$60,000, if the bank has an outstanding mortgage loan to an officer, the bank is unautho-
rized to grant the officer a second loan even if the two loans total less than $60,000.
1980] 1331
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standing aggregate amounts not exceeding $20,000,21 general purpose
loans not exceeding the aggregate amount of $10,000,22 and extensions of
credit in maximum amounts of $10,000 to partnerships controlled singly
or jointly by bank officers. 2s Further, if an executive officer of one bank
becomes indebted to another bank in amounts exceeding those extend-
able by his employer bank, the officer must report all such excessive loans
to the board of directors of his employer bank. 2' The report is important
to the employer bank since any loan by the employer bank to one of its
executive officers is payable upon demand when the officer becomes in-
debted to other banks in an aggregate amount exceeding the credit ex-
tendable by the employer bank under section 375a.25 Although section
375a only applies to executive officers of banks,2 section 375b applies to
both executive officers and other bank insiders.
Subsection (1) of section 375b prohibits extensions of credit by mem-
ber banks to their own executive officers,28 to persons owning, controlling,
or having the power to vote at least ten percent of any outstanding voting
stock in the bank,29 to companies 0 controlled by such officers and per-
12 U.S.C. § 375a(3) (Supp. II 1978). Unlike mortgage loans, see note 20 supra, execu-
tive officers may have several loans outstanding from their employer bank to finance their
children's educations so long as the total loan outstanding does not exceed $20,000. Section
375a does not define "education" and does not limit the term to tuition or any other specific
educational use. See 12 U.S.C. 375a(3) (Supp. II 1978).
22 12 U.S.C. 375a(4) (Supp. II 1978). The loans allowed under 375a(4) are permitted in
addition to those specifically authorized under § 375a(2) and (3) for mortgages and educa-
tion of executive officers' children. Indeed, the amount extended for a loan under any provi-
sion of § 375a(2)-(4) does not affect the amounts extendable to officers under any other
provision of § 375a(2)-(4). Thus, an educational loan extended to an executive officer under
§ 375a(3) would not affect the amount extendable to the same officer for a home mortgage
under § 375a(2).
23 12 U.S.C. § 375a(5) (Supp. II 1978). Except for the $10,000 general purpose loan
extendable to executive officers under § 375a(4), see text accompanying note 22 supra,
banks may not extend credit to partnerships in which executive officers of the bank, individ-
ually or jointly, maintain a majority interest. Further, for the purposes of § 375a(4), any
loans made to such a partnership are credited against the amounts extendable to each exec-
utive officer who belongs to that partnership. 12 U.S.C. § 375a(5) (Supp. II 1978).
24 12 U.S.C. § 375a(1)(D) (Supp. II 1978).
25 Id. Only loans made by banks other than the executive officer's employer bank must
be aggregated under § 375(a)(1)(D). Therefore, loans from employer banks to their own
executive officers are not aggregated with loans from other banks to the same officers.
2 See 12 U.S.C. § 375a (Supp. II 1978).
" See id. § 375b (Supp. II 1978); text accompanying notes 28-32.
28 12 U.S.C. § 375b(1) (Supp. H 1978). The definition of "executive officer" under
§ 375b is the same as under § 375a. Id. § 375b(6)(F); see 12 C.F.R. § 215.1(g), 2(d) (1979);
note 9 supra.
29 12 U.S.C. § 375b(1) (Supp. II 1978). In the case of a bank located in a municipality of
less than 30,000 persons, the prohibition of loans to bank shareholders is effective only when
the shareholder owns, controls, or has the power to vote at least 18% of the bank's voting
stock. Id. Congress included this exception for banks in towns of less than 30,000 persons to
facilitate infusion of capital into banks located in areas where capital is in short supply.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 1, at 9284. Although the concept of "control" in regard to
bank stock is not defined, "control" is defined in relation to control of companies. See note
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sons,31 and to political committees which benefit or are controlled by such
officers or persons, 2 where the aggregate outstanding amount exceeds the
limit imposed by section 84 of title 12 of the United States Code.3 3 Sec-
tion 84 prohibits the total obligations of any person, partnership, or cor-
poration to a bank from exceeding ten percent of the bank's unimpaired
surplus fund.
3 '
31 infra. As originaly proposed to Congress in the Safe Banking Act of 1977, § 375b(1)
would apply to holders of only 5% of a bank's stock. See Hearings on H.R. 9086, supra note
4, at 1885 (statement of American Banking Assoc.). The effect of prohibiting loans to 5%
shareholders, however, was potentially devastating to small banks because in the originally
proposed Safe Banking Act 5% shareholders were limited to borrowing 5% of a bank's as-
sets, whereas non-insiders could continue to borrow up to 10% of the bank's assets. See id.
at 1885. Thus, prosperous individuals in communities with banks having minimal assets
would be uninterested in investing in more than 5% of a bank's stock since any investment
over 5% by such individual would cut the line of credit extendable to that individual and
his business enterprise from 10% to 5% of the bank's assets. Id. at 1886.
30 For the purpose of § 375b, "company" means any form of business entity or trust,
except for any insured bank or any corporation in which the majority of shares is owned by
the federal or state government. 12 U.S.C. § 375b(6)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
31 Id. § 375b(1). A person is considered to control a company if he directly or indirectly
owns, controls, or can vote at least 25% of any voting securities in the company, controls the
election of a majority of the company's board of directors, or has the power to control the
policymaking functions of the company. Id. § 375b(5)(A)-(C). Further, a person is presumed
to control a company if that person is an executive officer or director of the company and
also directly or indirectly controls more than 10% of the company's voting stock. 12 C.F.R.
§ 215.2(b)(2)(i) (1979). The same presumption also applies if a person controls a greater
percentage of the same class of securities. Id. § 215.2(b)(2)(ii) (1979). A person to whom the
presumption of control applies may rebut the presumption by satisfying the cognizant regu-
latory agency that he does not maintain such control. Id. § 215.2(b)(4).
32 12 U.S.C. § 375b(2) (Supp. 1978). A political campaign or committee "benefits" a
bank insider when the organization's funds or services "benefit" that person. Id. No further
explanation of either "benefit from" or "control of" a political organization is given by the
statute, nor does the statute define political "committee" or "campaign". Therefore, banks
must use extreme caution when extending loans to political organizations and must require
bank insiders to acknowledge political affiliations with any prospective organizational
borrower.
Some guidance for interpreting the benefit concept might be gained, however, by exam-
ining the "Bert Lance for Governor" campaign. In 1974 T. Bertram Lance staged an unsuc-
cessful campaign for the Georgia Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Hearings on H.R.
9086, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of John P. Sherry, Attorney, Enforcement & Compli-
ance Section, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). During the campaign (May 1973-
December 1974), Lance was President and subsequently Chairman of the Board of the Cal-
houn First National Bank. From October 1973 through August 1974 the bank advanced its
own money to pay certain bills incurred by the Lance Campaign Committee. Id. Congres-
sional concern that Lance transferred the Calhoun First National Bank into a personal po-
litical machine, see id. at 38, might serve to restrict the concept of "benefits from" a politi-
cal organization to include only those persons who seek election. Thus, a campaign worker
might not be considered to benefit from a campaign committee even if compensated for his
services.
33 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
3 Id. Section 84 does not define either "paid-in unimpaired capital stock" or
"unimpaired surplus fund." Paid in capital, however, is that amount of consideration actu-
ally received by a corporation for the issuance of shares in the corporation. See H. HENN,
1980] 1333
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Where the aggregate amount of the loans exceeds $25,000, subsection
(2) of section 375b prohibits credit extensions to the same individuals and
enterprises affected by the provisions of subsection (1).11 An exception to
the $25,000 limit is permitted, however, if a majority of the entire board
of directors of the lending bank approves the additional credit prior to
extending the loan. 6 The extra amounts extendable by the board of di-
rectors are nevertheless limited to ten percent of the bank's assets as pro-
vided in sections 375b(1) and 84.s7 Additionally, subsection (2) of section
375b, unlike subsection (1), applies to bank directors8 and their business
and political enterprises. Thus, although subsection (2) initially appears
to have a wider scope than subsection (1) because directors are not sub-
ject to the limitations of subsection (1), directors appear able to procure
loans exceeding ten percent of the bank's assets. Since section 84 applies
to all persons and their enterprises, 9 however, even directors are prohib-
ited from borrowing more than ten percent of the bank's assets despite
the absence of such a prohibition in section 375b(1).
Regardless of the scope of subsections 375b(1) and (2), member banks
are also forbidden to extend credit to executive officers, directors, princi-
pal shareholders, and the enterprises of such insiders unless the loans are
on substantially the same terms as those prevailing for "comparable
transactions" with other customers and do not involve abnormal risk of
repayment or other "unfavorable features."4 Although Congress intended
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 126 (2d ed. 1970). Capital is considered unimpaired when dividends
are not paid out of the capital fund. See id. § 320, at 651. Paid-in surplus generally means
amounts contributed for shares in excess of the stated capital. See id. § 319, at 636 n.6.
12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
31 Id. No interested party may participate in the board of directors' vote to grant or
deny a loan from a lending bank to a bank insider. Id. Additionally, since a majority of the
entire board of directors must approve the loan and interested parties cannot participate in
the approval process, if half of the members of the board are "interested" parties regarding
a specific loan application, no approving majority exists and the bank may not lend over
$25,000.
" See 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 375b(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978); text accompanying notes 28-34
supra.
38 12 U.S.C. § 375b(2) (Supp. II 1978). Section 375b defines "directors" as persons who
are directors of any bank holding company of which their own bank is a subsidiary, or who
are directors of any other subsidiary of the same holding company. Id. § 375b(5)(D) (Supp.
II 1978). "Director" of a member bank includes even those directors who do not receive
compensation, but does not include any advisory director who is not elected by the bank
shareholders, is unauthorized to vote on matters before the board of directors, and who
provides only general policy advice to the board. 12 C.F.R. § 214.2(c) (1979). The exclusion
of nonelected, nonpolicymaking directors (outside directors) from the effect of § 375b stems
from congressional concern that inclusion of such directors in the prohibitions of § 375b
could hamper banks' efforts to procure effective advice. See Hearings on H.R. 9086, supra
note 4, at 137. Outside directors often are good customers of the bank which they serve, and
application of loan restrictions to these outside directors would deter their willingness to act
as advisors. See id.
3' See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Section 84, however, applies only to na-
tional banking associations. Id.; see note 3 supra.
" 12 U.S.C. § 375b(3) (Supp. II 1978). The terms "comparable transaction" and "un-
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the prohibition on loans which are not on substantially the same terms as
"comparable transactions" to prevent preferential loans, 1 the statute's
language is a model of imprecision.4 2 Further, in many instances the com-
plexity of a transaction is so unique that comparable business settlements
do not exist.
43
For the purpose of establishing the aggregate amount of outstanding
loans to insiders and their enterprises under section 375b, the Act broadly
defines controlling interests in companies to include those groups indi-
rectly controlled by bank insiders. 4 FIRICA does not limit the restric-
tions to incorporated organizations, but rather defines "company" to in-
clude most business enterprises. 45 By extending the credit limitations to
business enterprises generally, the Act prevents bank insiders from using
commercial organizations to obtain loans which the insiders could not le-
gally procure in -their individual capacities.46 A gap exists, however, in
FIRICA's definitional language. The Act prohibits loans not only to com-
panies controlled by insiders, but also to political or campaign commit-
tees which benefit or are controlled by insiders.47 Although control of a
company is defined by section 375b, 4 benefit from or control of a political
or campaign committee is not defined anywhere in the Act.40 Until imple-
menting regulations issuable by the federal regulatory agencies fill this
gap, lending institutions risk violating the Act whenever they extend
credit to political organizations of which bank insiders are members.
The final prohibition of section 375b forbids member banks from pay-
ing overdrafts on the accounts" of the bank's executive officers or direc-
tors, but excludes the bank's principal stockholders from the overdraft
favorable features" are not defined by § 375b or any implementing regulations. See text
accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra.
41 See Bell & Oliver, Correspondent Bank Loans After the Financial Institutions Reg-
ulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 34 Bus. LAW. 1347, 1353 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Correspondent Bank Loans].
42 See id.; note 40 supra. For purposes of bank compliance with the Act, the definition
of nonpreferential loans may cause serious problems. Although the regulatory agencies un-
doubtedly view the "catch-all" prohibition of loans demonstrating "unfavorable features" as
a flexible tool of enforcement, the statute's language does not afford a lending bank any
guidance as to the propriety of specific loans. Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at
1353.
" Guenter, The Lance Legacy-Title VIII of the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J. 292, 298 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Lance Legacy].
44 12 U.S.C. § 375b(5) (Supp. II 1978); see note 31 supra.
45 12 U.S.C. § 375b(6)(B) (Supp. H 1978); see note 30 supra.
41 See generally Lance Legacy, supra note 43, at 297.
47 See 12 U.S.C. § 375b(2) ( Supp. II 1978); note 32 supra.
48 See note 31 supra.
4" See note 32 supra.
50 The term "pay an overdraft on an account" means payment by a member bank of an
amount for an account holder in excess of the funds the account holder has on deposit. 12
U.S.C. § 375b(6)(G) (Supp. II 1978).
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payment restriction.5 1 Overdrafts in the form of preauthorized extensions
of credit 2 are exempt from the Act's prohibitions. Thus, executive of-
ficers and directors nevertheless may take advantage of tied accounts5
and other automatic credit procedures available to general customers of
the bank.
Congress extended restrictions similar to those of sections 375a and
375b to all banks maintaining correspondent accounts with other banks,
thereby fully implementing insider restrictions on banks and their execu-
tive officers, directors, and shareholders. Congressional belief that in-
siders could receive preferential loans from other banks by controlling
distribution of correspondent banking business resulted in promulgation
of Title VIII of the Act.5 5 Title VIII, entitled "Correspondent Accounts,"
is codified in title 12 of the United States Code at section 1972(2). 51 The
essential purpose of Title VIII is to prevent banks57 which maintain cor-
respondent balances (respondent banks)58 with other banks (correspon-
dent banks) 59 from extending credit 0 on preferential terms6 1 to one an-
51 12 U.S.C. § 375b(4) (Supp. II 1978).
2 A preauthorized extension of credit is a written, preauthorized, interest-bearing loan
specifying a method of repayment or a written, preauthorized transfer of funds from an-
other account of the account holder at the bank. Id. § 375b(6)(G) (Supp. II 1978).
53 Id.
", Tied accounts are related accounts between which transfers of funds are permitted.
See note 52 supra.
" See note 6 supra. Congressional investigators reviewing the proposed Safe Banking
Act of 1977 focused upon Lance's alleged misuse of his position as a bank insider to obtain
personal loans from correspondent banks, compensating the lending institution by place-
ment of a correspondent balance. See id.
56 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2) (Supp. II 1978).
17 For the purposes of § 1972(2), "bank" has the meaning given that word by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c), and includes branches of foreign banks and lending institutions controlled by a
foreign bank or foreign bank holding company. See 12 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976); 12 C.F.R.
§ 215.21(a) (1979). The definition of "bank" used in §§ 1971 and 1841(c) differs from the
one used in §§ 375a and 375b insofar as the § 1971 version includes branches of foreign
banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1976); note 15 supra.
" See Hearings on H.R. 9086, supra note 4, at 964. But cf. Correspondent Bank Loans,
supra note 41, at 1349-50 (defining bank at which correspondent account maintained as
"depository bank" and defining depositing bank as "correspondent bank").
" See Hearings on H.R. 9086, supra note 4, at 964. A correspondent bank is a bank
which maintains correspondent accounts for a member bank which, during a calendar year,
exceed a daily average balance during that year of $100,000 or .5% of such member bank's
total deposits, whichever is less. 12 C.F.R. § 215.21(d) (1979). Although § 1972(2) has been
criticized for not defining "correspondent accounts", see Lance Legacy, supra note 43, at
297-98, the regulations promulgated under § 1972(2) now clearly define the term as an ac-
count maintained by a bank with another bank for the deposit or placement of funds. 12
C.F.R. § 214.21(c) (1979).
60 "Extension of credit" under § 1972(2) is defined by reference to 12 U.S.C. § 371(c)
(1976). Section 371, only describes transactions which are included under the label "exten-
sion of credit" and does not conclusively define the term. Section 371 provides that for "the
purposes of this section, (1) the terms 'extension of credit' and 'extensions of credit' shall be
deemed to include (A) any purchase of securities, other assets or obligations under repur-
chase agreements, and (B) the discount of promissory notes, bills of exchange, conditional
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other's executive officers, directors, and principal shareholders.6 2 The
opportunity for abuse by insiders of correspondent accounts arises in de-
termining the appropriate level of a correspondent balance.63 An insider
of a respondent bank might open an account in the name of his bank at
another institution and in return receive a personal preferential loan from
the correspondent bank. The correspondent account is thus used as com-
pensation for the preferential loan."
Section 1972 lists four prohibitions designed to prevent abuse of corre-
spondent accounts.15 These restrictions forbid extensions of credit by
both correspondent and respondent banks to any insider of the other
bank on preferential terms or with abnormal risk of repayment.68 Addi-
tionally, no respondent bank may open an account with a correspondent
bank if either bank has outstanding preferential loans to insiders of the
other bank.67 These restrictions serve to limit two different types of po-
tential abuse of correspondent accounts. Two of the four prohibitions
prevent respondent banks from maintaining inordinately large accounts
for correspondent banks to compensate the correspondent bank for ex-
tending preferential treatment to respondent bank insiders.65 The re-
maining two prohibitions prevent correspondent banks from accepting
disproportionately low balances from respondent banks in order to com-
pensate respondent banks for extending preferential credit treatment to
sales contracts, or similar paper. . " 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1976). Taken literally, § 1972(2)
would limit only repurchase arrangements and discount transactions, but Congress probably
intended the restriction to extend to direct loans as *ell. See Lance Legacy, supra note 43,
at 296.
"1 The language of § 1972(2) which describes the elements of preferential loans is iden-
tical to the language used in § 375b and thus suffers from the same shortcomings. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 375b(3), 1972(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. II 1978); text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
62 "Executive officer" is accorded the same meaning under § 1972(2) as under § 375a. 12
U.S.C. § 1972(2)(E) (Supp. II 1978); see note 9 supra. "Principal shareholder" is defined by
the regulations promulgated under §§ 375a, b, see 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(2), .21(e) (1979), as a
person who owns or controls 10% of a bank's voting securities. 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(2) (1979).
63 See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1349.
64 Id.
65 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. II 1978). Subsection (2)(A) prohibits corre-
spondent banks from extending credit, except on a nonpreferential basis, to executive of-
ficers, directors, and ten % shareholders of respondent banks. Subsection (2)(B) prohibits
respondent banks from opening correspondent accounts with correspondent banks if the
correspondent bank has a preferential loan outstanding to executive officers, directors, or
ten % shareholders of the respondent bank. Subsection (2)(C) prohibits respondent banks
from extending preferential credit to executive officers, directors, and ten % shareholders of
correspondent banks. Subsection (2)(D) prohibits respondent banks which have outstanding
loans to executive officers, directors, or ten % shareholders of correspondent banks from
opening a correspondent account of the correspondent bank unless all such outstanding
loans are nonpreferential. Id.; see Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1351.
- 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A), (C) (Supp. II 1978); note 65 supra.
67 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(B), (D) (Supp. II 1978); note 65 supra.
6 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. II 1978); Correspondent Bank Loans, supra
note 41, at 1351-52; note 4 supra.
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insiders of the correspondent bank.69 These prohibitions apply regardless
of whether the size of the correspondent account is justified by the vol-
ume of business transacted between the banks. The statute does not con-
sider if a connection exists between a correspondent account and loans
extended by one bank of that correspondent relationship to insiders of
the other related bank. 0 Enforcement of a statute which would apply
only where the correspondent account acted as compensation for prefer-
ential loans would, however, present a formidable task. Congress there-
fore wisely chose an absolute ban on preferential loans where banks are
linked by correspondent accounts.7 1 Nevertheless, the Act does not ban
preferential loans from one bank to insiders of another where the respec-
tive institutions do not share a correspondent relationship.
72
FIRICA's disclosure requirements are crucial to enforcement of Title
VIII of the Act.73 Section 1972(a)(G)(i) 74 requires that each executive of-
ficer and each recorded stockholder controlling ten percent of voting bank
stock 5 make a written report to the board of directors of their own bank
describing any loans received from a correspondent bank maintaining an
account in the name of the insider's institution. 6 Each insured bank is
then required to accumulate the reports filed pursuant to the reporting
requirement and forward the reports to the appropriate regulatory
agency. 7 Additionally, each insured bank must list all of their executive
officers and recorded shareholders who obtain credit from banks sharing a
correspondent relationship with the reporting institution and must also
list the aggregate amount of such credit extended to each executive officer
and shareholder of record .
7
The reporting requirements of Title VIII are not, however, properly
designed to enforce the statute fully. Although section 1972(2) prohibits
preferential loans from banks in a correspondent relationship to insiders
of banks sharing in that relationship, the disclosure requirements apply
69 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(C) & (D) (Supp. II 1978); Correspondent Bank Loans, supra
note 41, at 1352; note 63 supra. Whether potential for abuse exists in cases where a corre-
spondent bank accepts an inordinately low correspondent balance from a depositing (re-
spondent) bank in order to compensate the depositing bank for extending preferential loan
to insiders of the correspondent bank is uncertain. Id.
70 See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1352.
71 Id.
'2 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. II 1978).
73 See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(G) (Supp. II 1978).
74 Id. § 1972(a)(G)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
76 The term "ten percent stockholder of record," as used in the disclosure sections, is
defined as 10% shareholder, who is also recorded as a shareholder of any bank stock. 12
U.S.C. § 1972(G)(i) (Supp. II 1978). The individual need not, however, be the record holder
of 10% of the bank stock. See Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 3 at 811 n.30. Therefore,
disclosure requirements of § 1972(2) apply to record share owners controlling at least 10%
of the bank stock, even though the shareholder is not a record holder of a full 10% interest.
'1 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(G)(i) (Supp. II 1978).
77 Id. § 1972(2)(G)(iii) (Supp. II 1978); see note 3 supra.
78 Id. § 1972(2)(G)(iii) (Supp. II 1978).
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only to the respondent bank.7 9 Secondly, the reporting regulations do not
apply to bank directors even though Title VIII includes directors within
the insider category for purposes of the prohibitions in section 1972.80
Not only are the reporting requirements deficient, but testimony in
congressional hearings criticized the prohibitions of both Titles I and VIII
for failure to restrict loans from banks to the family members of bank
insiders.81 During the hearings, various spokesmen expressed concern that
the prohibitory effects of FIRICA on loans from banks to bank insiders
would be circumvented if family members of bank insiders obtained loans
unavailable to the insider and then allowed the related bank insider to
enjoy the benefits of the loans.82
Compliance with Title VHI will be difficult due to the administrative
bookkeeping generated by the reporting requirements and the uncer-
tainty regarding the definition of a preferential loan. Accordingly, banks
should clarify internal policy to all banks insiders and standardize meth-
ods of discovering correspondent bank-related loans.83 Organization of
bookkeeping procedures should include notification to all insiders of the
bank's correspondent relationships so that insiders might avoid even the
appearance of preferential loans to and from insiders of correspondently
related banks." A simple way to reduce both the bookkeeping load and
the possibility that a loan violates section 1972(2) is for banks to elimi-
nate nonessential correspondent relationships.8 5
The Act requires that each bank executive officer and ten percent
shareholder annually disclose to his board of directors all loans to him or
to his affiliates from banks maintaining a correspondent account in the
name of the insider's bank." Both the form and timing of this report,
however, are left open. The timing of insiders' reports to their respective
board of governors will be dictated by the deadline required of banks for
filing their annual Title IX report87 to the appropriate regulatory agen-
cies. Thus, to permit time to prepare disclosures, banks must require
their insiders to fie Title VIII disclosures sufficiently in advance of the
due date for bank's Title IX report.88
Since the Act prohibits respondent banks from opening correspondent
accounts with correspondent banks if the correspondent bank has ex-
79 See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1355.
80 See id.
81 See Hearings on H.R. 9086, supra note 4, at 101, 131, 139 & 414.
82 See id.
" See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1355-56.
84 Id. at 1355.
85 Id. at 1356.
86 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(G)(i) (Supp. II 1978); see text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
87 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(k)(1), 1972(G)(ii)-(iii) (Supp. II 1978). Although no-date is set for
the required filing of a bank's report of correspondent loan activity, presumably regulatory
agencies will set a date by which a bank must submit its report to the appropriate banking
agency. See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1356.
" Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41, at 1356.
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tended preferential credit to an insider of the respondent bank,s9 respon-
dent banks should survey their insiders to determine that no preferential
loans from a correspondent bank exist. If a preferential loan is discov-
ered, bank management has two options. It can forego the correspondent
relationship or persuade the insider with the preferential loan to pay off
the loan or modify its terms so as to eliminate any element of
preference.90
Since the Act also prohibits respondent banks from opening corre-
spondent accounts at other banks when the respondent bank has ex-
tended preferential credit to insiders of the correspondent bank,9 ' man-
agement of the respondent bank should request a list of correspondent
bank insiders. The list should be examined to determine whether the re-
spondent bank has any outstanding preferential loans to correspondent
bank insiders.
Recent events have altered the legality of preferential loans extended
within correspondent banking relationships. Because of Title VIII of the
new Act and the high profile of the Lance case, regulators will likely be-
come increasingly attentive to correspondent relationships in their bank
examinations. Further, by extending loan prohibitions to an expanded
category of "insiders", Title I of the Act serves to prevent bank failures
caused by banks overextending credit to persons exercising control over
bank policy.
ROBERT G. McLusKY
See 12 U.s.c. § 1972(2)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 41 at 1357.
" See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(D) (Supp. II 1978); Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note
41, at 1357. But cf. id. (claiming that § 1972 prevents correspondent banks from accepting
correspondent accounts when the respondent bank has extended preferential credit to its
own insiders).
